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THE LICENSING DILEMMA: UNDERSTANDING THE
DETERMINANTS OF THE RATE OF TECHNOLOGY
LICENSING
ANDREA FOSFURI*
Department of Business Administration, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Madrid,
Spain
The licensing of technology entails a trade-off: licensing payments net of transaction costs
(revenue effect) must be balanced against the lower price–cost margin and/or reduced market
share implied by increased competition (profit dissipation effect) from the licensee. We argue
that the presence of multiple technology holders, which compete in the market for technology,
changes such a trade-off and triggers more aggressive licensing behavior. To test our theory, we
analyze technology licensing by large chemical firms during the period 1986–96 for 107 chemical
products. We find that the rate of technology licensing displays an inverted U-shaped relationship
with the number of potential technology suppliers and is negatively related to the licensor’s
market share and to the degree of technology-specific product differentiation. Copyright  2006
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
The last two decades have witnessed an unprece-
dented growth in a variety of arrangements for the
exchange of technologies and technological ser-
vices (Rivette and Kline, 1999; Rigby and Zook,
2002). In the United States alone, technology
licensing revenues are estimated to account for
U.S. $45 billion annually; worldwide, the figure is
around U.S. $100 billion (The Economist, 2005).
The biopharmaceutics, software, semiconductor
and telecommunications sectors have made the
licensing of intellectual property a way of life.
It is not surprising that small technology-based
firms license their intellectual property. Lacking
the downstream manufacturing, distribution, and
marketing capabilities, they have no other means
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of appropriating returns from innovation. More
surprising is the active promotion of licensing-
based strategies by large, established producers.
Firms such as Union Carbide, Procter & Gam-
ble, DuPont, Boeing, Hoechst, IBM, Texas Instru-
ments, AT&T, and Phillips Petroleum are now
explicitly considering licensing revenues as a part
of the overall return from their technological
investments (Rivette and Kline, 1999). These firms
are well established, have large market shares in
the product markets, and are capable of exploiting
the technology on their own.
This paper examines the licensing strategies of
large firms by focusing on some of the deter-
minants of their rate of technology licensing. In
particular, we aim to shed light on the relation-
ship between competition in the market for tech-
nology and the licensing decisions of firms. We
argue that a firm’s rate of technology licensing
can be explained by the interplay of two effects
that licensing produces on the licensor’s profits:
the profit dissipation effect and the revenue effect
(Arora and Fosfuri, 2003). Indeed, technology
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licensing forces a trade-off: licensing and roy-
alty revenues net of transaction costs (the rev-
enue effect) must be balanced against the lower
price–cost margin and/or reduced market share
implied by increased competition (the profit dis-
sipation effect) from the licensee. The presence of
multiple technology holders, which compete in the
market for technology, changes such a trade-off
and triggers more aggressive licensing behavior.
We then focus on two other potentially impor-
tant determinants of a firm’s rate of technology
licensing: the licensor’s market share in the prod-
uct market and the degree of technology-specific
product differentiation.
We test our theory on a sample of large chem-
ical firms that possess technological competen-
cies in a set of 107 chemical products by exam-
ining their licensing strategies over the period
1986–96. The chemical industry has a long tra-
dition of technology licensing (Arora, 1997) that
allows us to gather reliable data. In addition, as
we highlight in the next section, there are often
several technologies available from different licen-
sors to produce the same chemical product, which
helps us to underscore the effect of competi-
tion in the market for technology. There is an
established market for polyolefin production pro-
cesses, for instance, with about 25 polyethylene
and 8 polypropylene technologies available. Large,
established chemical producers like Dow Chem-
icals, BP-Amoco, Exxon-Mobil, Union Carbide,
Univation, and Basell, along with independent
technology suppliers like Novolen and Engelhard,
compete face to face in the licensing market (Tullo,
2003).
This research contributes to several streams of
the licensing literature. First, using concepts from
economic theory, we build a simple framework
that helps us to predict empirically a firm’s rate of
technology licensing. It goes beyond the standard
transaction costs theory used in the management
literature to explain why licensing is or is not
chosen for a given transaction (Williamson, 1991;
Teece, 1986, 1988). We follow an approach that
considers the impact of licensing on the whole
value chain of the licensor rather than narrowly
focusing on economizing on every single trans-
action. Needless to say, transaction cost consid-
erations are still important in shaping a firm’s
licensing strategy. Hence, our approach comple-
ments rather than substitutes the extant transaction
costs theory.
Second, and most important, this work con-
tributes to the relatively underdeveloped empiri-
cal research on licensing. This lacuna is under-
standable. In many industries, licensing is a recent
phenomenon, so available data are scattered. In
addition, firms tend to conceal information about
licensing deals, which are typically considered to
be strategic decisions that are not publicly dis-
closed.
Anand and Khanna (2000a) provide one of
the few econometric investigations of the rate of
licensing. Their study is aggregated at the level
of the sector, and they do not attempt to explain
inter-firm differences in the rate of technology
licensing. Arora and Ceccagnoli (2006) analyze
how patent effectiveness affects a firm’s patenting
behavior and its propensity to license. They do not
look, however, at the interaction between licensing
decisions and competition in the market for tech-
nology, which is crucial in this paper. Recently,
several scholars have directed their attention to
the analysis of licensing practices by universities
(Mowery and Shane, 2002). For instance, Sine,
Shane, and Di Gregorio (2003) have shown that
the rate of licensing by universities is an increas-
ing function of their prestige. However, university
licensing decisions differ considerably from those
made by large firms, primarily because universities
do not have stakes in the product market.1
Other empirical research on technology trans-
fer has focused on the factors that determine a
firm’s choices among various organizational forms
(e.g., Teece, 1986; Hill, 1992). For instance, Gans,
Hsu, and Stern (2002) study the determinants of
commercialization strategy for start-up innovators.
Within this tradition, the empirical literature has
paid particular attention to foreign market entry
choices (e.g., Kogut and Singh, 1988; Hill, Hwang,
and Kim, 1990). None of these studies investigated
the factors underpinning the rate of technology
licensing among firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. The next section briefly discusses licensing
dynamics in two chemical products and explains
the motivation behind our interest in the role of
competition in the market for technology. Then,
1 In the strategy literature, a great deal of research has been
devoted to the analysis of alliances (e.g., Dussauge, Garette, and
Mitchell, 2000). Although licensing could be considered as a
special type of alliance, the evidence has shown that licensing
contracts behave quite differently, and therefore deserve ad hoc
attention (Anand and Khanna, 2000b).
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the article develops the theoretical framework for
explaining the rate of technology licensing among
firms and formulates some testable hypotheses.
The description of the empirical methodology and
data is followed by a discussion of the results and
the overall conclusions.
TECHNOLOGY LICENSING IN THE
CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
Technology licensing in the chemical industry has
a long tradition. Cross-licensing agreements were
already being used at the beginning of the 20th
century as a means of maintaining market shares
and deterring entry into an international chemical
market characterized by the presence of strong car-
tels (e.g., Arora, 1997). It was only after World
War II, however, that firms started to use licensing
to profit from innovation, and a market for chem-
ical technology began to arise. Beginning in the
1950s, an increasing number of chemical processes
became available for licensing. In this section, we
briefly describe licensing dynamics in two chemi-
cal markets, highlighting the role played by com-
petition in the technology market in shaping the
licensing strategies of firms.2
Acrylic acid
Acrylic acid is a common chemical compound, and
the key ingredient in many household products:
paints, textiles, adhesives, plastics, and detergents,
for example. Although first prepared in 1843, it
was not until the late 1920s that acrylic acid was
produced commercially and not until the early
1950s that it was used in any major way. Several
processes—acetylene-based, acrylonitrile hydrol-
ysis, ketene process, ethylene cyanohydrin pro-
cess—were employed to produce acrylic acid prior
to the 1970s, when Nippon Shokubai, a Japanese
chemical firm, developed the standard technol-
ogy based on propylene oxidation. Until the mid
1980s, Nippon Shokubai licensed its technology,
which was also available through another Japanese
firm, Mitsubishi Chemicals, but other technology
holders, like the German giant BASF, did not. In
recent times, however, all the potential licensors
2 These two short case studies have been constructed using infor-
mation assembled from a variety of sources, most notably spe-
cialized chemical journals, the business press, and the Internet.
are also producers, with symmetric stakes in the
acrylic acid market and a strong interest in main-
taining market stability. Thus the attitude toward
licensing has become more conservative, even
among Nippon Shokubai and Mitsubishi Chemi-
cals, as firms tend to avoid direct and potentially
destructive competition in the licensing business.
Most licensing is now directed at markets with
strong growth potential that could not be reached
by any other means. Hence, a sort of tacit collusion
in the market for acrylic acid technology seems to
be in place nowadays.3
Ethylene glycol
Ethylene glycol is a clear, colorless, odorless, vis-
cous liquid with a sweet taste that can produce dra-
matic toxicity. It is commonly found in antifreeze,
automotive cooling systems, and hydraulic brake
fluids and is used in industrial settings as a solvent
and as raw material in a variety of processes.
Although ethylene glycol was prepared as early
as 1856, it was not until the 1920s that the U.S.
firm, Union Carbide, began commercial produc-
tion. The dominant technology for producing ethy-
lene oxide is currently the direct oxidation of ethy-
lene, a process developed by a French firm at
the beginning of the 1930s and subsequently per-
fected by Union Carbide. By the end of the 1940s,
two other companies—Shell and the engineer-
ing firm Scientific Design—had developed new
technologies based on the oxidation of ethylene.
Other technologies have been tried and abandoned
by such firms as Dow Chemicals and DuPont,
either because they were economically unviable or
because they were environmentally unsound.
Union Carbide, the world’s largest producer of
ethylene glycol, used its own process captively and
did not license it. Scientific Design, which did not
have a stake in the final market, licensed its pro-
cess aggressively and now has the largest share of
built capacity. The other major player, Shell, both
used and licensed its own process. Recently, Union
Carbide has also started to license its technology in
a highly selective way. It is important to emphasize
3 Economic theory suggests that tacit collusion is more likely
when there are few symmetric firms. Although tacit collusion is
assumed away in our theoretical framework, its inclusion would
imply that aggressive licensing occurs when there are many
technology holders with heterogeneous stakes in the product
market, an implication that has the same flavor as our Hypotheses
1 and 2.
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the role of Scientific Design, which was the source
of the technology, but not an active producer of
the final product. The firm was not inhibited by
concerns over its production position or by poten-
tial competition from new players. Its behavior has
precipitated more proactive licensing strategies by
Shell and Union Carbide—companies that may
otherwise have shown greater concern for their
market shares. Consequently, the industry structure
of the ethylene glycol market is highly fragmented,
with many players and strong competition in most
regions of the world.
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND
HYPOTHESES
A licensing contract is the less integrated, more
market-based alternative allowing firms to profit
from their innovation. In fact, licensing is posi-
tioned at the extreme of a continuum of governance
structures ranging from a market mechanism to
hierarchy, i.e., in-house exploitation of the inno-
vation (Williamson, 1991).
The standard framework for analyzing licensing
decisions is provided by transaction costs theory.
This approach suggests that, given an absence
of significant contracting hazards, an arm’s-length
contract such as licensing would be the most direct
way to capture profits from a firm’s intellectual
asset, such as a process or an idea. However,
writing and executing a reliable contract for the
use of technology requires adequate specification
of property rights, monitoring, and enforcement
of contractual terms—any of which may be
problematic. Teece (1988) identifies three major
sources of transaction costs in technology transfer:
(a) incomplete contracts that leave either party
open to opportunistic behavior by the other;
(b) transaction-specific investments that can give
rise to switching costs and ‘lock-in’ problems; and
(c) leakages of valuable proprietary information to
potential competitors.
One weakness of the transaction costs theory in
its analysis of licensing decisions is its narrow
focus around isolated transactions (Williamson,
1999: 1102). Each transaction is treated as an inde-
pendent item, bearing almost no relationship to
previous or future transactions or with the rest
of the firm’s activities (Argyres and Liebeskind,
1999; Nickerson, Hamilton, and Wada, 2001). If
interaction effects are missed or if holistic conse-
quences are glossed over, transaction costs theory
would suggest that licensing is chosen when the
transaction costs of using a market-based mecha-
nism for profiting from innovation are sufficiently
small (Teece, 1988). However, a licensing agree-
ment might not take place, in spite of low trans-
action costs, if it does not fit within the firm’s
overall strategy because of negative effects on
other sources of revenues that outweigh the prof-
its from the transaction. The net balance is the
important variable in deciding whether to license
or not. This argument suggests that, rather than
focusing on economizing at the level of single
transactions, it is advisable to consider the effects
of technology licensing on the whole value chain
(i.e., economizing at the level of the firm): technol-
ogy management cannot be performed in isolation
from other value-creating activities, such as pro-
duction or distribution.
Revenue effect vs. profit dissipation effect
Below, we develop a framework that accounts for
these subtleties and allows us to predict empiri-
cally the rate of technology licensing among firms.
Our approach does not substitute the extant trans-
action costs theory, but rather complements it. We
still argue that, other things held constant, smaller
transaction costs stimulate licensing. One should
bear in mind that the following discussion focuses
on technology licensing and omits any reference
to product licensing.
Licensing decisions result from the interplay of
two effects that licensing generates on the licen-
sor’s profits: the profit dissipation effect and the
revenue effect (Arora and Fosfuri, 2003). The rev-
enue effect is the present value of the flows of
money accruing to the licensor in the form of
licensing payments, net of all possible transac-
tion costs that bear on the seller of the technol-
ogy. It is the revenue effect on which firms focus
when striking a licensing deal.4 In the words of
one of Dow’s vice-presidents, ‘by both licensing
and using the technology we could generate more
cash . . ..’ The revenue effect is positively related
4 We are ignoring the possibility that licensing might be due to
strategic reasons like the blockading of entry (Gallini, 1984) or
in order to select competitors (Rockett, 1990). Most importantly,
in industries with strong network externalities, licensing may be
a way to set and control industry standards (Shapiro and Varian,
1998).
Copyright  2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 27: 1141–1158 (2006)
DOI: 10.1002/smj
The Licensing Dilemma 1145
to the gross profits that the licensee can extract
from the licensed technology, negatively related
to the transaction costs, and positively related to
the bargaining power of the licensor. As predicted
by the transaction costs theory, therefore, other
things held constant, larger transaction costs imply
a smaller revenue effect and, in turn, make licens-
ing a less attractive strategy (Teece, 1986). Need-
less to say, transaction costs, bargaining power,
and gross profits earned by the licensee are func-
tions of other variables. For instance, the licensor’s
bargaining power increases with the strength of
intellectual property rights protection and with the
number of suitable licensees.
The profit dissipation effect is the reduction in
the licensor’s profits (i.e., all profits other than pay-
ments from the licensing agreement) that might
occur as a consequence of an additional firm com-
peting in the product market or of an existing
firm becoming more aggressive.5 Additional com-
petition in the downstream market can reduce the
price–cost margin and/or erode market share. As a
result, a licensor that also competes in the product
market may encounter a reduction in the profits
from directly producing and commercializing the
final good. The danger of increased competition
in the licensor’s own market is echoed by industry
players and is often reported as the main reason for
not licensing out: ‘For our main chemical products,
such as epoxy and polyketones, we just don’t want
to license them out because it would threaten our
market’ (a Shell spokesperson).
Although the licensor has many strategies to
limit the extent of this latter effect (for instance,
the contract may impose quantity restrictions or
exclusive territories or unit royalties may be set
to control the licensee’s output), an entrant is
nevertheless a potential threat to the licensor. For
instance, Hill et al. (1990) report the case of RCA,
which once licensed its color TV technology to
a number of Japanese companies for exclusive
exploitation in Japan. The Japanese companies
quickly assimilated RCA’s technology, however,
and used it to compete directly with RCA in the
U.S. market.
The profit dissipation effect depends on several
factors, primary among them being the magnitude
5 Technology licensing might allow the entry of a firm that
is currently outside the relevant market or might increase the
efficiency of an incumbent firm when the licensor transfers its
low-cost production technology. In both cases, competition in
the product market is likely to increase.
of the competitive pressure exerted by a new
player in the downstream market. It is the careful
comparison between the profit dissipation effect
and the revenue effect that explains whether a firm
is licensing or not, and, if it does, how much it is
licensing.
The role of competition in the market for
technology
Let us consider a situation in which the profit dis-
sipation effect dominates the revenue effect. This
is typically the case of a monopolist in both the
product and the technology market. In the absence
of any threat in the market for technology (i.e.,
no other sources for the technology), the firm
would optimally decide not to license. The pres-
ence of another producer (the licensee) would cer-
tainly put some pressure on the price that will fall
below the monopoly level. Unless other reasons
are introduced, the firm could not earn greater prof-
its licensing than not licensing. We are implicitly
assuming here that the demand for the final prod-
uct is stable and that the incumbent monopolist has
already made the necessary investment in order to
satisfy such demand. Now suppose that another
firm has developed the technology to produce the
final product and can potentially license it to an
entrant. For the sake of simplicity, assume that
this potential licensor cannot produce the product
itself. For instance, in the chemical industry, many
process technologies are licensed by specialized
engineering firms that have no stake in the prod-
uct market and focus their business model around
the design, engineering, licensing, and sometimes
the construction of chemical plants (Arora, Fos-
furi, and Gambardella, 2001). Now assume that a
potential entrant exists—one that needs a license
to enter the market. What is the most plausible
scenario if the monopolist does not license its tech-
nology? The potential entrant could strike a deal
with the other technology owner and ultimately
compete with the monopolist in the product mar-
ket. As a result, the monopolist might suffer both
eroded market share and reduced price–cost mar-
gin. Moreover, the monopolist does not collect
any licensing payment because it has opted not to
license its technology. In other words, the monop-
olist would have suffered from the profit dissipa-
tion effect in any case; but at least it would have
benefited from the revenue effect, had it licensed
out its technology to the potential entrant.
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The argument would stand unchanged if the
perspective licensee were a higher-cost incum-
bent seeking a more efficient production technol-
ogy. The key assumption here is that all potential
licensors have functionally equivalent technolo-
gies. Indeed, a company with proprietary low-
cost production technology might still not want to
license out its technology, despite the presence of
multiple players that license similar but less effi-
cient technology. However, the main idea remains
unchanged: weaker competition in the market for
technology implies less incentive to license, other
things held constant.
When a market for technology exists, as is typi-
cally the case for most chemical process technolo-
gies, a technology holder’s refusal to license will
not block entry into the product market, because
the prospective licensee can obtain the technology
from other potential licensors. Hence, the pres-
ence of multiple sources for a technology creates
a strategic incentive to license.
However, we do not expect the relationship
between the rate of technology licensing and the
number of potential technology suppliers to be
monotonic everywhere. There are at least two argu-
ments to suggest that, after a certain threshold,
the rate of technology licensing might actually
decrease as the number of potential technology
suppliers increases. First, the number of poten-
tial licensees for a given process technology is
bounded. In some cases, in fact, the search for
suitable licensees turns out to be a long and costly
process (Contractor, 1981). If the number of poten-
tial licensees is fixed and bounded and the number
of potential licensors keeps increasing, at a certain
point, the number of effective licenses per licensor
will hit the constraint. After that, a further increase
in the number of potential licensors produces
a reduction in the average number of licenses.
Second, a larger number of technology suppliers
means stronger competition in the market for tech-
nology. Licensors have weaker bargaining power
vis-a`-vis the prospective licensees. In other words,
the revenue effect tends to be competed away when
the number of potential licensors increases. When
payments from licensing are insufficient to cover
transaction costs, firms stop licensing.
In sum, the presence of multiple sources for
a technology tilts the balance between the profit
dissipation effect and the revenue effect. Some
competition in the market for technology makes
profit dissipation considerations less important,
sparking more aggressive licensing behavior. How-
ever, very strong competition in the market for
technology annihilates the revenue effect, which,
in turn, makes licensing less appealing.
By combining the various arguments, we can
formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: There exists an inverted-U shaped
relationship between the rate of technology
licensing and the number of potential technol-
ogy suppliers.
In industries in which standards play a crucial role,
firms may license aggressively because they would
like their technology to be widely diffused. This
alternative argument would also predict a positive
relationship between the rate of technology licens-
ing and the number of competing technologies.
Battles over standards are more important early
in the product life cycle (Teece, 1986). Because
we focus empirically on mature chemical products
with well-established markets, we partially con-
trol for that possibility. However, one should be
cautious about interpreting empirical findings.
Market share
We focus here on the direct effect of the licensor’s
market share in the product market on its incen-
tives to license, all other variables left unchanged.
We analyze only the impact of market share on the
profit dissipation effect, because the revenue effect
is unrelated (at least directly) to market share. As
noted previously, the profit dissipation effect is
the erosion of profits due to additional compe-
tition in the product market. Hence, we claimed
that a technology holder licenses if the net licens-
ing revenues are greater than the loss in profits
due to increased competition in the product mar-
ket. Although all incumbent producers potentially
lose from the increased competition, each licen-
sor only internalizes the negative effect on its
own profits. The smaller the profits the licensor
obtains from direct production prior to licensing,
the smaller this negative effect. This implies, in
turn, that other things equal, firms with smaller
market shares have stronger incentives to license,
as they suffer from a much smaller profit dissipa-
tion effect. This argument can best be understood
by fixing the quantity produced by each firm and
assuming that entry simply reduces the price–cost
margin. Firms that sell larger quantities, i.e., firms
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with larger market shares, would suffer most from
competition because the same reduction in the mar-
gin is multiplied by a higher volume of sales.
Therefore, firms that center their business model
on the pure supply of technology with no stakes
in the product market have stronger incentives to
license than do established producers that enjoy
large market shares. This argument is exempli-
fied by the various ways in which BP Chemicals
has approached the acetic acid and polyethylene
businesses. In acetic acid, BP has strong propri-
etary technology and a substantial market share.
It licenses selectively, typically granting a license
only in order to obtain access to markets it would
otherwise be unable to enter. In contrast, BP’s
market share in polyethylene is small. Although
it has good proprietary technology in polyethylene
as well, there are many other sources of technology
for making polyethylene. Thus, BP has licensed its
polyethylene technology aggressively, competing
with Union Carbide, the market leader in licensing
polyethylene technology. We can therefore state
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The higher the licensor’s share
in the product market, the smaller its rate of
technology licensing.
A key assumption behind our argument is that
market share is independent of other firm-specific
variables. However, market share is likely to be
positively correlated with the licensor’s stock of
such complementary assets as distribution or man-
ufacturing. A large endowment of complementary
assets better insulates the licensor from the poten-
tial competition exerted by the licensees, thereby
reducing the profit dissipation effect. However,
the presence of a strong competitor reduces the
licensees’ expectations of future profits and, hence,
their willingness to pay for the technology. The
revenue effect shrinks as well, possibly offsetting
the reduction in the profit dissipation effect. In
addition, a larger market share might be due to a
more efficient technology. Because the technology
is more valuable, the licensor can extract a larger
payment from the licensees. However, the licen-
sor is also likely to face reduced competition in
the market for technology, thereby having fewer
incentives to license out its technology. As we
argued above, this second effect is likely to domi-
nate. Finally, a larger market share might be asso-
ciated with a greater ability to extract rent from the
licensees—because of stronger bargaining power
in licensing negotiations, for instance—thereby
increasing the revenue effect. This correlation is
likely to mitigate the negative relationship between
the rate of technology licensing and market share,
as stated in Hypothesis 2.
We acknowledge the possibility that anticipated
market share, i.e., the potential market share the
licensor expects to gain, may sometimes be more
important than current market share in driving
licensing decisions. This possibility can be easily
tested, however: current market share should not
show up significant in the empirical analysis.
Product differentiation
Product differentiation implies that the price elas-
ticities of demand for different varieties are not
infinite at equal prices. Product differentiation is
due to both tangible features (e.g., size, reliability,
durability, or safety) and intangible features (e.g.
image, status, or esthetic considerations). For the
argument we develop below, the important factor is
that product differentiation is technology-specific
rather than firm-specific. We assume that two firms
using identical technology would produce indistin-
guishable varieties of the product. By contrast, two
firms using different technologies would produce
differentiated varieties.6 Hence, product differenti-
ation is due to differences in the process technol-
ogy rather than to simple branding. In turn, this
feature fits quite well with most chemical prod-
ucts in our database—like ammonia, acetic acid,
polypropylene—in which the major source of dif-
ferentiation is the technology (e.g., type of catalyst,
temperature, feedstock) rather than the firm.
The role of technology-specific product dif-
ferentiation is better understood by focusing on
the profit dissipation effect alone. Let us do the
following thought experiment. Consider the mar-
ket for polyethylene, and assume that Mitsui, with
its own proprietary technology, competes in the
downstream market with several other producers.
Assume that Mitsui has a 2 percent market share.
Let us start with the case in which the final prod-
uct, polyethylene, is perfectly homogeneous across
6 If product differentiation is also firm-specific, the profit dissi-
pation effect would shrink because licensor and licensee do not
compete head to head. Hence, greater firm-specific product dif-
ferentiation would imply more licensing. However, the correla-
tion between technology-specific product differentiation and the
rate of technology licensing would be qualitatively unchanged.
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all producers. Mitsui is a small player and, as we
argued above, would not suffer undue loss if an
additional firm were to step in and start producing
polyethylene. Hence, the profit dissipation effect
for Mitsui is relatively small and could well be
smaller than the revenue effect. Mitsui might have
strong incentives to license. Even if Mitsui has a
good proprietary technology, in fact, it might be
difficult for the firm to gain a larger share of the
polyethylene market. Licensing is a quick and rel-
atively risk-free alternative for accomplishing this
task.
Now, consider the opposite situation, in which
each producer has a well-defined market niche.
In other words, the polyethylene market is highly
differentiated and each firm, because of its idiosyn-
cratic technology, is producing its own not-easily-
substitutable variety. Although Mitsui is a small
player in the overall polyethylene market, it is
almost a monopolist in its niche. Licensing would
create much stronger competition in this case, as
Mitsui would allow the entry of another firm using
the same technology and producing the same vari-
ety. The profit dissipation effect is much larger,
and the firm might not find it profitable to license.
In addition, other technology suppliers are less of a
threat because, even if they license, they would not
allow direct entry into Mitsui’s own market niche.
This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The higher the degree of
technology-specific product differentiation, the
smaller the firm’s rate of technology licensing.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
We hypothesize that the rate of technology licens-
ing is generated by the function y = f (x, β),
where y is licensing counts, x is a vector of
explanatory variables that include those identi-
fied in our hypotheses (plus all available con-
trol variables), and β is a vector of parameters
to be estimated. Because the dependent variable
is discrete and non-negative, with numerous zero
entries, conventional linear regression models are
inappropriate. The simplest model form to accom-
modate count data is the Poisson regression model.
To guarantee non-negativity of λ, we model the
single parameter of the Poisson distribution func-
tion, λ, as E[y] = λ = exp(xβ). However, our
dependent variable has a variance that is four times
larger than its mean, suggesting the presence of
overdispersion. If this is the case, although the
parameters will be consistently estimated, their
standard errors will typically be underestimated,
leading to spuriously high levels of significance. To
address this problem, we use a negative binomial
regression, which provides more efficient estima-
tors (Hausman, Hall, and Griliches, 1984). Another
econometric concern is the large number of zero
observations. As a robustness check, we estimate
an equation using a zero inflated negative binomial
regression (Greene, 2000).
Our data on licensing come from Chemintell, a
commercial database compiled by Chemical Intel-
ligence Services (Chem-Intell), a division of Reed
Telepublishing Ltd, which is a member of the Reed
Elsevier Plc Group. Chemintell purports to be
comprehensive, covering the entire population of
chemical plants in the period under study. Chem-
intell provides information on over 36,000 plants
announced or constructed all over the world in
1980–96, in what is broadly defined as the chem-
ical sector. It also reports, albeit incompletely,
information on plants built prior to 1980. The
database is organized by plant. It reports the name
of the company that ordered the plant, the name of
the licensor for that plant (or ‘staff’ for in-house
licensing), the city and country in which a plant is
located, the name of the chemical process or the
product, the date at which the investment was first
reported in the specialized trade press, and other
information. For about 40 percent of the plants,
Chemintell also reports the total cost of investment
in the plant in millions of U.S. dollars; and, for a
larger number of the plants, it shows the actual or
planned capacity.
To test our hypotheses, we focused on a sam-
ple of large chemical firms from developed coun-
tries (Western Europe, United States, Canada, and
Japan) that had, by the year 1988, more than
U.S. $1 billion in aggregate sales (Aftalion, 1991).
Of this set of firms, only 153 had at least one
plant reported in Chemintell. These are the firms
we used in our study: 67 U.S., 1 Canadian,
32 Japanese, and 53 European firms. (The com-
plete list of firms is available upon request.) We
restricted our attention to this sample of large
firms because we had to collect firm-specific vari-
ables that our database did not provide. Moreover,
the focus of this paper is on the licensing strate-
gies of large corporations, which face the trade-off
between revenue effect and profit dissipation effect
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more intensely than do smaller firms. Therefore,
the licensing activity of specialized technology
suppliers, small firms, and start-ups is omitted from
our study.
We look at the rate of technology licensing of
our large chemical firms in a sample of 107 prod-
ucts. This sample includes all the most important
products in our dataset (as defined by worldwide
investment) and accounts for more than half of
all plants listed in Chemintell. ‘Ammonia’ and
‘acetic acid’ are two examples of such products.
Because we selected the products with large world-
wide installed capacity, our sample is more repre-
sentative of bulk chemicals than of specialties. A
complete list of products along with their classi-
fication in chemical sub-sectors is available upon
request.
As a first step, we want to identify the firms
that possess technological capabilities in a given
product, and that can therefore license to others.
Then, we can examine the licensing behavior of
these firms, which obviously changes across prod-
ucts. The set of potential licensors of ammonia
process technology is different from the set of
potential licensors of acetic acid process technol-
ogy, although the two sets might overlap.
To address this issue, we exploited the rich-
ness of our dataset. We split the data into two
periods—1980–85 and 1986–96—using the first
period to identify which of our 153 firms possessed
technological capabilities in any of our 107 prod-
ucts. As a criterion, we used the fact that the firm
in question had either licensed the technology or
built a plant in-house, using its own technology.
As a sensitivity check, we also considered a dif-
ferent time break: 1980–87 and 1988–96. We also
experimented with a more demanding criterion:
two plants instead of one. Neither of these manipu-
lations changed the qualitative results.7 Finally, we
used our second period of 1986–96 to examine the
licensing behavior of these firms.
One might wonder why we did not exploit the
time dimension of our dataset more efficiently
by creating a panel rather than a cross-section
averaged over 1986–96. There are three reasons
for such aggregation. First, some variables, such
as the number of potential licensors or the degree
7 It is important to remind the reader that we are examining the
licensing of the process technology used to fabricate a given
chemical product. Our dataset does not report product licensing,
which is the major subject of transaction in pharmaceuticals, for
instance.
of product differentiation, vary little from year to
year. Second, given the size and timing of the
investment in a chemical plant, licensing decisions
tend to be correlated to long-term rather than short-
term changes. Finally, and most important, we
have few plants licensed by each sample firm per
year, which would make our dependent variable
highly skewed towards zero (the share of positive
observations will be below 3%).
A final important clarification concerns the geo-
graphical definition of the market. Although the
chemical industry is dominated by large multina-
tional firms, most chemical products included in
our sample are characterized by significant trans-
portation costs relative to their unit value. This
is especially true for bulk chemicals—the vast
majority of our products—and less so for special-
ties.8 Hence, production tends to take place, with
some notable exceptions, close to the final mar-
ket.9 To capture this localized feature of chemical
markets and following the partition provided in
Chemintell, we have divided the world into seven
geographical areas: Africa, Western Europe, East-
ern Europe, North America, South America, the
Middle East, and South East Asia. As a robust-
ness check, we have tried a finer partition, in
which we isolated the big country markets (United
States–Canada, China, India, Russia, Mexico) and
lumped other countries together using member-
ship in trade blocks (EU, Mercosur, ASEAN) or
geographical continuity (Middle East countries,
Central European countries). This second partition
produced 10 geographical areas. Although every
definition of market can be criticized, similarity of
results between these two groupings should make
us confident about the robustness of our empirical
findings.
To summarize, we examine the rate of tech-
nology licensing of large chemical firms (indexed
by i), in a set of product markets that are defined
8 In addition, some products are difficult to move because of
their specific features. For instance, acrylic acid is highly cor-
rosive to many metals and must be stored in stainless steel-,
glass-, aluminum- or polyethylene-lined equipment. Also, many
chemical acids degrade over time by polymerization.
9 In 2002, the share of imports to apparent consumption in the
United States was 3 percent for sulfuric acid and pharmaceutical
preparations; 3.4 percent for chlorine gas; 21 percent for titanium
dioxide; less than 1 percent for oxygen, nitrogen, and carbon
dioxide; 1.1 percent for hydrogen; and less than 10 percent for
paint products (US Census Bureau at http://www.census.gov).
Trade in plastics tends to be higher.
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around chemical products (indexed by j ) and geo-
graphical areas (indexed by k).
Variables
Rate of licensing
This variable measures the number of licensed
plants by firm i, in product j , and geographical
area k, over the period 1986–96. As discussed
above, only a small subset of our 153 firms has
technological competencies in any given product
j . Moreover this subset tends to change for each
product.
Potential licensors
We want to capture the presence of other sources
of technological competencies. In other words, we
would like to know how many other firms are
capable of supplying the process for producing
product j . We do so by counting the number
of firms (excluding firm i) that have licensed a
given process technology for producing product
j in the period 1980–85 or have built a plant
in-house using their own technology. This is a
good proxy for the number of potential licensors
of that technology in the period 1986–96. There
are two potential measurement errors that could
affect this proxy: (1) some firms may not have
been technologically active in the period 1980–85,
but can potentially license their technology in
the period 1986–96. For instance, they might
not have developed technological capabilities until
1985; (2) some firms may have been licensing
their technology in the period 1980–85, but could
not license in the period 1986–96—because their
technology had become obsolete, for instance. Yet
the average number of potential licensors is similar
in magnitude to the average number of ‘real’ licen-
sors (i.e., the number of firms that have licensed in
the period 1986–96), with a correlation above 0.6.
In approximately 40 percent of the cases, the two
numbers coincide. In half of the remaining cases,
the number of potential licensors is smaller than
the number of real licensors, whereas the opposite
is true for the rest of our observations. Finally,
it is also plausible that this measure varies across
geographical areas. The set of potential technol-
ogy suppliers for polyethylene process technology
in the United States may differ from the set of
potential technology suppliers in China. There may
be geographical idiosyncrasies that render a tech-
nology suitable for the economic, legal, and envi-
ronmental conditions of one area, but unsuitable
for another. We have estimated our regressions
with the number of potential licensors varying
across j and across jk. Because qualitative results
do not change, however, we only show the latter
in order to save space.
Market share
We compute the market share of firm i, in product
j , and geographical area k as the ratio between
the capacity built by firm i in jk and the total
capacity in jk. Because we did not have access
to the market shares of firms in the mid 1980s,
we had to reconstruct them using the information
on capacity investment provided by our database.
Although correlated with sales, installed capac-
ity may not always be a good proxy for sales.
However, there are no reasons to believe that the
difference between installed capacity and sales is
distributed across our sample of firms and products
in a way that would bias our findings, although we
cannot guarantee that this does not occur.
Product differentiation
Chemintell does not provide a direct measure of
technology-specific product differentiation at the
level of the product j . To operationalize this vari-
able, we built a principal component of three
different proxies. Although each proxy has its
weaknesses, we think that our principal compo-
nent measure captures the variability associated
with technology-specific product differentiation.
The first proxy, which we believe is the most accu-
rate, is the number of different feedstocks that can
be used to fabricate a given product, standardized
by the size of the world market of that product.
In many cases, different technologies use differ-
ent feedstocks, and the physical properties of the
final product might depend on the specific feed-
stock employed. The second proxy is computed
at the sub-sector level. Chemintell classifies all
products in 23 sub-sectors. We use plant counts
at the product level to compute a Herfindahl index
at the sub-sector level (Sutton, 1991). Our index
of product differentiation takes the value of 0 if
the sub-sector has homogeneous products and the
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value of 1 if the products are totally differenti-
ated.10 Our third proxy of product differentiation is
the average cost in U.S. dollars per unit of capacity
installed in each product j . To compute this mea-
sure, we have summed all investments (in U.S.
dollars) in a given product and divided by the sum
of the installed capacity in the same product. We
expect that more homogeneous and basic prod-
ucts are produced in large-scale plants in which
the cost per unit of capacity installed is lower.
By contrast, more differentiated and sophisticated
products are produced in small plants and tend to




This variable measures the growth potential in the
demand for chemical plants in product j and geo-
graphical area k. We use the ratio between the
total number of plants constructed in jk during
the periods 1991–86 and 1980–85. We expect to
observe a positive relationship between the rate
of technology licensing and demand growth, as
a rising demand relaxes the negative effect on
the licensor’s profits due to increased competi-
tion.
Potential licensees
The larger the number of potential licensees, the
stronger the bargaining power of the licensor and,
hence, the larger the revenue effect from licens-
ing. Indeed, Contractor (1981) points out that, in
some cases, the search for suitable licensees turns
out to be a long and costly process. Hence, we
posit a positive relationship between the rate of
technology licensing and the number of poten-
tial licensees. The number of potential licensees
is computed as the number of downstream chemi-
cal producers active in product j and geographical
market k prior to 1986. This proxy is likely to
underestimate the number of potential licensees,







, where m refers to the subsector and j to
the product. NBPLANT is the number of plants.
as it does not account for entry. The next con-
trol helps us to partially overcome this limita-
tion.11
Set-up costs
This variable measures the average cost of setting
up a chemical plant in product j . Larger set-up
costs imply that entry into the downstream market
is more difficult, thereby limiting the number of
potential licensees. Therefore this variable com-
plements our proxy for the number of potential
licensees.
Aggregate sales
We include this variable to control for the effect of
firm size on the rate of technology licensing. For
instance, larger firms could have stronger bargain-
ing power in the licensing negotiations or better
options to profit from their technological compe-
tences. We use the natural log of aggregate sales of
firm i in 1988 to compensate for skewness (Aftal-
ion, 1991).
Multinational
This variable complements aggregate sales to con-
trol for firm size. Multinational counts the number
of different countries in which firm i operates.
R&D intensity
For each firm i, R&D intensity captures the ratio
between R&D expenditures and sales in 1988
(Aftalion, 1991). The sign of this variable is not
theoretically clear a priori. Higher R&D intensity
means that the firm is more likely to possess
valuable technological assets to license out. On the
other hand, firms tend to avoid giving away their
state-of-the-art technology and typically prefer to
license older vintage technologies. However, the
reason for including this variable, as well as the
aggregate sales and multinational variables, is to
control for firm-specific sources of variation that
might affect the rate of technology licensing.
11 As a robustness check, we also used the number of down-
stream chemical producers that were active in geographical mar-
ket k at the subsector level. This variable accounts for potential
entry by diversification. Results do not change qualitatively.




Our theory suggests that the greater the trans-
action costs, the smaller the revenue effect and,
in turn, the smaller a firm’s rate of technology
licensing. Therefore we must control as well as
we can for different sources of transaction costs.
We use the following variables. Experience is a
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if firm i
has undertaken at least one licensing deal prior to
1986 in product j and geographical area k. Expe-
rience in gathering information about prospective
licensees, negotiating, and writing and enforcing
contracts lowers the cost of licensing. Experience
is therefore a good proxy for the transaction costs
of licensing. We posit that, by reducing transaction
costs, experience makes licensing a more appeal-
ing strategy. Patents reports the total number of
patents granted at the U.S. Patent Office during
the period 1976–95 to the technology used to fab-
ricate product j . As several authors have noted
(e.g., Teece, 1988; Von Hippel, 1994), patents are
more likely to be issued for technologies in which
the underlying knowledge is sufficiently codifiable.
Process technologies that have been granted few
patents are more likely to rely on trade secrecy
and are, hence, less likely to be transferred through
contracts. Finally, we use a set of dummy vari-
ables for chemical sectors to help us to con-
trol for sector-specific differences in transaction
costs. For instance, some chemical sectors may
have better legal protection of intellectual prop-
erty, thereby reducing transaction costs. Chem-
intell classifies all products into nine broad sectors:
Oil Refining, Petrochemicals, Minerals and Metal-
lurgy, Plastics and Rubber, Inorganic Chemicals,
Agriculture, Gas, Organic Chemicals, and Miscel-
laneous.12
Dummy variables for geographical areas
This set of dummy variables is meant to con-
trol for sources of heterogeneity across loca-
tions. Some areas could have better conditions
for technology licensing—better access to related
technological services that make the transaction
easier, for instance.
12 As mentioned above, Chemintell also provides a finer classi-
fication of products into 23 chemical subsectors.
Dummy variables for licensor nationality
This set of dummy variables helps to control for
cross-country heterogeneity in the attitude towards
licensing.
Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations,
and correlations among the dependent, indepen-
dent, and control variables. The table employs our
first definition of geographical market in which the
world is divided into seven areas.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 2 shows the results of the negative bino-
mial regressions using Chemintell’s partition of the
world in seven geographical areas. Table 3 shows
the same regressions for our second definition of
geographical markets. As a robustness check, we
have also performed Poisson estimations. Results,
available from the author upon request, are similar
to those reported here. However, the overdisper-
sion parameter in the negative binomial regressions
is significantly different from zero, thus reinforc-
ing our conjecture that the Poisson distribution is
inappropriate.
Model 0 omits the core covariates, showing
only the baseline model with the control variables.
Models 1 and 2 differ only in the definition of
market share. Whereas Model 1 reports the mar-
ket share at the level of the product–geographical
area, Model 2 shows the worldwide market share
at the product level. Our discussion above suggests
that, for many chemical products, production tends
to take place close to the final market; thus Model
1 is our preferred specification. An LR test com-
paring the sparser specification (Model 0) with the
augmented models (Models 1 and 2) suggests that
our main explanatory variables play a significant
role on top of the controls.
There are 1748 observations in Table 2.13 Hypo-
thesis 1 predicts that the rate of technology licens-
ing is first increasing and then decreasing in the
number of potential technology suppliers. To test
this hypothesis, we add a square term to the
number of potential licensors. If our hypothesis
is correct, we should obtain a positive coefficient
for the number of potential licensor and a nega-
tive coefficient for the square term. The parameter
13 As we have explained above, we have a highly unbalanced
panel: 153 firms, 107 products and seven geographical areas
would total more than 100,000 observations in a balanced panel.
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Table 2. Rate of technology licensing by firm i in product j and geographical area k (seven geographical
areas)
Variable Negative binomial Zero-inflated
model
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2
Constant −3.544∗∗∗ −5.124∗∗∗ −4.587∗∗∗ −3.465∗∗∗
Potential licensors 0.140∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗
Square term −0.012∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗
Market share in jk −6.506∗∗∗ −6.496∗∗∗
Market share in j −5.609∗∗
Product differentiation −1.011∗∗∗ −1.006∗∗∗ −1.154∗∗∗
Controls
Potential licensees 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
Set-up costs −0.001 −0.002∗ −0.002∗ 0.002
Demand growth 0.097∗∗ 0.080∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.072∗
Log of aggregate sales −0.131 −0.070 −0.103 −0.063
Multinational 0.010 0.019 0.019 −0.028
R&D intensity −7.671∗∗ −6.162∗∗ −6.749∗∗∗ −8.703∗∗∗
Experience 4.253∗∗∗ 4.283∗∗∗ 4.171∗∗∗ 3.499∗∗∗
Patents −0.008 0.036 0.013 −0.066
Dummy variables for chemical sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummy variables for geographical areas Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummy variables for licensor nationality Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 1748 1748 1748 1748
Log-likelihood −790 −757 −768 −742
Chi-squared 623 689 667 135
∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
estimate for the number of potential licensors is
positive and highly significant in all specifications
reported in Table 2. We also find a negative and
significant coefficient for the square term, sug-
gesting that the relationship between the rate of
technology licensing and the number of technology
suppliers displays an inverted-U shape. By using
Model 1, for instance, one can show that the inflec-
tion point is around 6 (notice that the number of
potential licensors varies between 0 and 17, with
an average of about 3). If all other variables are
kept at their mean value, moving from no poten-
tial licensors to 5 potential licensors would imply
an increment in the rate of technology licensing of
about 50 percent.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that firms license more
in product markets where they have smaller mar-
ket shares. Indeed, as we argued above, the profit
dissipation effect is positively correlated to mar-
ket share. The sign of the parameter estimate for
market share in Model 1 is negative and highly
significant. If all other variables are kept at their
mean value, moving from a 5 percent market share
to a 10 percent market share would reduce the rate
of technology licensing by about 40 percent. In
Model 2, we use as a regressor the worldwide mar-
ket share in product j . Although the coefficient is
still negative and significant, we observe a smaller
magnitude and a much larger standard deviation.
As an additional robustness check, we have also
run a regression, using only the observations in
which firm i has a non-zero market share. Indeed,
the decision to license by a firm with existing
facilities in the market might be a quite different
decision from that made by a firm with zero mar-
ket share. Qualitative results remain unchanged,
although coefficients display larger standard devi-
ations, due to the reduced number of observations.
Hypothesis 3 suggests that firms show a higher
rate of technology licensing when the product mar-
ket is sufficiently homogeneous. We used as a
measure of technology-specific product differen-
tiation a principal component extracted from three
proxies. The coefficient is negative and significant,
suggesting that technology licensing is less likely
to occur in a differentiated product market. This
finding seems to support Hypothesis 3. Keeping
all other variables at their mean value, a standard
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Table 3. Rate of technology licensing by firm i in product j and geographical area k (10 geographical areas)
Variable Negative binomial Zero-inflated
model
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2
Constant −1.901 −3.622∗∗∗ −3.576∗∗∗ −3.920∗∗∗
Potential licensors 0.363∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗
Square term −0.030∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗
Market share in jk −2.992∗∗ −6.716∗∗∗
Market share in j −0.243
Product differentiation −0.981∗∗∗ −0.940∗∗∗ −1.231∗∗∗
Controls
Potential licensees 0.053∗∗∗ 0.036∗ 0.036∗ 0.044
Set-up costs −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗
Demand growth 0.254∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.080∗
Log of aggregate sales −0.157 −0.102 −0.103 0.093
Multinational 0.038∗ 0.040∗ 0.036 0.001
R&D intensity −8.837∗∗∗ −7.854∗∗ −7.690∗∗∗ −10.512∗∗∗
Experience 0.794∗∗∗ 0.718∗∗∗ 0.717∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗
Patents 0.021 0.072 0.055 0.136
Dummy variables for chemical sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummy variables for geographical areas Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummy variables for licensor nationality Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 2294 2294 2294 2294
Log-likelihood −970 −949 −951 −917
Chi-squared 274 316 312 122
∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
deviation increase in the level of product differenti-
ation would reduce the rate of technology licensing
by 40 percent. As a robustness check, we have also
entered our three proxies separately as measures
of product differentiation. Results (not included)
are qualitatively similar to the ones reported in
Table 2.
The signs of the other variables are reason-
able. Particularly interesting is the positive and
highly significant coefficient of the number of
potential licensees in a given product market jk.
A larger number of licensees creates greater bar-
gaining power for the licensor. It also means that
the licensor is much more likely to find a licensee
that better suits the idiosyncrasies of the licensor’s
technology. In turn, this implies that the value
generated from the transaction is higher, making
licensing a more appealing option. Additionally,
the average set-up cost for a chemical plant in
product j has a negative impact on the rate of tech-
nology licensing, thereby confirming that larger
investment costs reduce the demand of technology.
Demand growth has the positive expected sign,
significant in all regressions. The findings seem
to support the idea that higher transaction costs
reduce the rate of technology licensing. Indeed,
our dummy for experience in licensing in product
j and geographical area k is positive and highly
significant. However, the coefficient of the number
of patents is not statistically different from zero.
This finding is not surprising, in light of Cohen,
Nelson, and Walsh’s (2000) results; they found
that patents are not good instruments for protecting
process innovations. Our measures of firm size are
not significant, whereas R&D intensity is negative,
implying that firms with less R&D intensity have
a higher rate of technology licensing.
As we discussed in the previous section, one
important econometric concern is the presence
of a large number of zeros in our dependent
variable. We have controlled for this potential
problem through a zero-inflated negative bino-
mial regression (Greene, 2000). A zero-inflated
negative binomial model, also known as hurdle
model, assumes that the zeros are generated by
a different process from the remaining counts.
A binary probability model determines whether
a zero or a nonzero outcome occurs; then, in
the latter case, a (truncated) negative binomial
distribution describes the positive outcomes. All
Copyright  2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 27: 1141–1158 (2006)
DOI: 10.1002/smj
1156 A. Fosfuri
our explanatory variables have been used in the
binary probability regression—except for the sec-
tor, nationality, and geographical area dummies,
which we omitted because of convergence prob-
lems in the estimation. Results for the (truncated)
negative binomial distribution are shown in the
last column of Table 2. All variables of theoreti-
cal interest maintain their sign and significance. A
positive Vuong test shows that the inflated model
performs slightly better than the standard negative
binomial model. Moreover, many of the coeffi-
cients in the binary probability model are not sta-
tistically significant, which may imply that many
zeros simply stand for the impossibility to license,
and do not capture the deliberate outcome of a
firm’s decision.
Table 3 reports our findings using the finer
partition of the world into the 10 geographi-
cal areas described above. It is comforting to
see that all variables keep their sign unchanged,
although some coefficients display larger stan-
dard deviations. This suggests that our results are
robust to different definitions of geographical mar-
kets. Model 2 additionally confirms our conjec-
ture that the relevant market share is at the prod-
uct–geographical area level, and not worldwide.
CONCLUSION, DISCUSSION, AND
IMPLICATIONS
There is increasing evidence that firms in some
sectors hope to profit from their intellectual prop-
erty not merely by embodying it in their own
output, but also by licensing it to others, includ-
ing potential competitors. Licensing does, how-
ever, entail a trade-off: licensing revenues must
be balanced against the lower price–cost margin
and/or reduced market share implied by increased
competition from the licensees. In this paper we
argued that competition in the market for technol-
ogy could trigger more aggressive licensing behav-
ior. Indeed, the trade-off between profit dissipa-
tion effect and revenue effect that normally guides
licensing decisions should be adjusted for the pres-
ence of rival licensors. In particular, when there are
multiple technology holders, they not only com-
pete in the product market; they also compete
in the market for technology. Because licensing
partially substitutes for production, firms lacking
adequate downstream commercialization (produc-
tion and marketing) capabilities are naturally more
aggressive licensors. Moreover, we have argued
that increasing product differentiation, when driven
by differences in the technologies, not only soft-
ens price competition in the product market, but
also reduces the rate of licensing in the technology
market.
We tested this framework using an extensive
dataset on worldwide investment in chemical
plants. We examined licensing strategies by the
use of a sample of large chemical producers in
more than 100 products. Our results suggest that
the presence of a market for technology plays a
crucial role in creating incentives for a more proac-
tive licensing behavior. Firms that normally would
have not licensed their technology might be forced
to do so because of the competitive pressure in the
market for technology.
Two contributions are particularly worth empha-
sizing here. First, this research underscores the
crucial role of a market for technology in shaping
firms’ licensing strategy. This finding has impli-
cations both for the literature that has addressed
the rationales behind a firm’s decision to license
(Gallini, 1984; Rockett, 1990; Anand and Khanna,
2000a) and for the literature on innovation and
technology exploitation (Teece, 1986; Gans et al.,
2002). In the former case, our paper suggests that
in some industries it might be problematic, if not
wrong, to analyze a firm’s licensing strategy in
isolation, abstracting from product and technology
market dynamics. Indeed, most of this literature
has assumed that the licensor is a monopolist tech-
nology holder, implying that the analysis of all
potentially interesting interactions in the market for
technology have not been considered. In the latter
case, our paper offers an approach better suited to
understanding a firm’s rate of technology licensing
rather than the extant transaction costs framework,
although we still claim that transaction costs are
important, ceteris paribus. Second, and perhaps
most important, our paper provides one of the few
large-scale studies of the determinants of the rate
of technology licensing. This contribution is partic-
ularly valuable in light of the recent trend towards
a more widespread use of licensing agreements for
the exploitation of the firm’s intellectual property.
Our study has several limitations. From an
empirical point of view, our database did not pro-
vide any measure of technology-specific product
differentiation, forcing us to use proxies. Although
we believe that these proxies represent the missing
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measure accurately, there is room for improve-
ment. Ideally, this measure should capture the dif-
ference between the product produced with a firm’s
own process technology and the products fabri-
cated by other incumbents. In this case, our empir-
ical analysis could benefit from additional data
collection, which might require an in-depth analy-
sis of all process technologies available for each of
our 107 products. In addition, although our theory
predicts that stronger competition in the market
for technology generates additional incentives to
license because it changes the trade-off between
the profit dissipation effect and the revenue effect,
other explanations might generate similar findings.
For instance, if standard setting is important, firms
might license aggressively because they would like
to have their technology widely diffused (Shapiro
and Varian, 1998). Although we focus on mature
product markets in which standards battles are less
crucial, empirically disentangling this alternative
explanation is not easy. Hence, the interpretation
of our findings should be made with caution. Theo-
retically our framework would clearly benefit from
a deeper integration of our strategic positioning
approach with the transaction costs approach. Ide-
ally, one should be able to predict simultaneously
the choice of the governance structure and the
extent to which each governance structure is used.
Finally, as far as it concerns the generality of our
findings, one could easily contend that they are
idiosyncratic to the chemical industry. As a partial
defense to our work, we could point to empirical
evidence showing that industries with large licens-
ing activity, such as electronics, biotechnology,
and semiconductors, are also those that have suf-
ficiently well-functioning markets for technology
(Arora et al., 2001). However, only future research
can demonstrate whether our findings are industry-
specific or more generally applicable.
From a more applied point of view, our study
suggests that firms exploiting licensing opportuni-
ties must ensure that the trade-off between licens-
ing revenues and rent dissipation is well man-
aged. First of all, this requires a close coordination
between the various activities in the firm’s value
chain. Technology management cannot be per-
formed in isolation from other value-creating activ-
ities such as production, distribution, and sales.
Second, it becomes crucial to educate business
managers about the net value added from sale of
products vs. that from licensing. Licensing rev-
enues are rarely comparable to the revenues from
sales of products, but the cost of generating a dol-
lar of licensing revenues is significantly lower than
the cost of generating a dollar of product sales.
Finally, it requires that managers have incentives
consistent with those of the firm as a whole. Man-
agers who are rewarded for sales growth or market
share will tend to overlook licensing opportunities.
A final cautionary remark is needed. The recent
enthusiasm by many industry practitioners and
independent consultants about the virtue of licens-
ing might, in some cases, be misplaced. Licensing,
especially when triggered by the presence of a
market for technology, is a double-edged sword.
Although some firms may benefit from aggres-
sive licensing, the final outcome is likely to be
increased competition in the product market and
lower overall industry profits. Attempts to implic-
itly or explicitly collude in the licensing market,
which are relatively common in the history of the
chemical industry, confirm the relevance of this
argument.
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